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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

clarify existing law, not to change a substantive change law.
Based on these investigations, the court found that public policy
required that the amendment operate retroactively. Thus, Schwartz'
conveyance was subject to the Transfer Act and summary judgment
was denied.
In addition, the court noted that the language of CEPA only precluded an action against the state for pollution that occurred prior to a
conveyance of property. Thus, it followed that an action against an individual or other entity based on prior contamination was not prohibited.
StephaniePickens

GEORGIA
Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 1997) (holding that the
appellant failed to present admissible evidence demonstrating navigability and, therefore, prosecution for trespassing was appropriate).
Ichauway, Inc. sued to enjoin Givens from floating down Ichauwaynochaway Creek through its property. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Ichauway. On appeal, Givens asserted
he had presented sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to the stream's navigability. The Supreme Court of Georgia
held that Givens failed to establish the creek's navigability and that
Ichauway, therefore, had the fight to exclude the public-a right creating legally tenable grounds to charge Givens with criminal trespass.
In Georgia, the statutory definition of navigable creek is one that is
"capable of transporting boats loaded with freight in the regular
course of trade ...." The mere rafting of timber or the transporting

of wood in small boats shall not make a stream navigable." Although
Givens attempted to demonstrate the creek's navigability in a number
of different ways (among others, Givens built a raft of styrofoam and
wood, loaded it with a goat, a bale of cotton, and two passengers, and
floated it through Ichauway's leasehold), the court rejected his arguments stating that he failed to present evidence showing the creek's
navigability under the state's statutory definition.
Alternatively, Givens argued that an 1894 Georgia case, Young v.
Harrison,defined three different types of rivers in the state: (1) those
which are wholly private property; (2) those which are "private property subject to the servitude of the public interest, by a passage upon
them"; and (3) those subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Givens
contended that the Young court's language supported a common law
right of passage as an alternative to the state's statutory definition. The
court stated that the legislature had codified the Young decision in the
statutory definition of a navigable creek and that a court could not interpret the language of Young to extend a right of passage to streams
not found to be navigable under the statute.
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The dissent attacked the majority on grounds ranging from procedure to substantive law. The dissent stated that summary judgment
was usually inapplicable in equity matters. The dissent also stated that
the legislative history of Georgia's statutory definition of navigability
did not support the court's narrow construction of the term "navigability." Furthermore, the dissent stressed that statutes should be interpreted as codification of the common law unless otherwise explicitly
contrary, as the statute was in this case, and that navigability is a federal
question whereby the court was compelled to consider navigability under both state and federal law.
Amy W Beatie

ILLINOIS
Independent Trust Corp. v. Chicago Dep't of Water, 693 N.E.2d 459
(M11. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that a hydrant lead is not "firefighting
equipment or facilities" within the meaning of the Tort Immunity
Act).
The basement of 205 West Randolph Street in Chicago flooded on
February 20, 1994. The water department discovered the basement
and subbasement filled with over ten feet of water. Water department
employees removed the water and investigated the cause of the leak.
They observed multiple hairline cracks in the hydrant lead, a six-inchdiameter pipe connecting an adjacent fire hydrant to an underground
water main. This pipe caused the flooding to occur.
Plaintiffs, Independent Trust Corp. and First Management Realty
Corp. owned the building. Pago Pago II, Inc. and Corporation Supply
Company, Inc. each operated a business in the building. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company was a subrogee of Corporation Supply. All three plaintiffs filed separate suits against the city and the
court consolidated their cases. Each alleged the city negligently maintained, inspected, or repaired the pipe. The circuit court granted the
city's motion to dismiss because the hydrant lead was "firefighting
equipment or facilities" within the meaning of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the "Act").
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois.
The appellate court held that the hydrant lead was not "firefighting equipment or facilities" within the meaning of section 5-103(a) of
the Act and, therefore, the lower court erred in granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The court declared the city not immune
from liability in this case.
The court first analyzed the Act. The Act does not grant general
immunity to municipal water providers. Unless their specific conduct
falls within another section of the Act, the water provider may be held
liable. Defendants argued immunity under section 5-103(a) which
states: "Neither a local public entity, nor a public employee acting in

